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Abstract

The purpose of this research was to develop an information requirements analysis
method that would provide the Director of Cyberspace Forces with the information
required to support effective command and control of cyberspace. This research
investigates the role of information in command and control, information in the
traditional war fighting domains, cyberspace as a war fighting domain, and various
methods of determining information requirements of organizations. This research
produced an information requirements analysis method that is suitable for identifying the
command and control information requirements of the Director of Cyberspace Forces.

iv

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Dr. Robert Mills for his guidance
throughout the course of this research effort.

Brian D. Aschenbrenner

v

Table of Contents
Page
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. v
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... ix
I. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
Background .................................................................................................................... 2
Problem to be Investigated ............................................................................................. 5
Scope/Methodology ....................................................................................................... 6
Preview........................................................................................................................... 6
II. Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 7
Overview ........................................................................................................................ 7
The Role of Information in Command and Control ....................................................... 7
Information in the Traditional Warfighting Domains .................................................. 12
Air Force Cyber Command .......................................................................................... 19
Information Requirements Analysis ............................................................................ 23
Summary ...................................................................................................................... 29
III. Methodology ............................................................................................................... 31
Overview ...................................................................................................................... 31
Phase One ..................................................................................................................... 31
Step One .................................................................................................... 32
Step Two ................................................................................................... 33
Phase Two .................................................................................................................... 33
Phase Three .................................................................................................................. 35
IV. Analysis and Results ................................................................................................... 37
Phase One ..................................................................................................................... 37
Step One .................................................................................................... 38
Step Two ................................................................................................... 39
Offensive Counter Cyber Operations.................................................................... 40
Defensive Counter Cyber Operations ................................................................... 41
Cyber Warfare Support Operations ...................................................................... 42
Phase Two .................................................................................................................... 44
Phase Three .................................................................................................................. 48

vi

Page
V. Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................ 54
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 54
Recommendations for Future Research ....................................................................... 55
Summary ...................................................................................................................... 56
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 59

vii

List of Figures
Figure

Page

1. Information Requirement Categories............................................................................ 3
2. Cross Domain Effects ................................................................................................... 4
3. Visualization of the Operational Environment ............................................................. 8
4. Information Quality Criteria ....................................................................................... 10
5. John Boyd's OODA Loop ........................................................................................... 11
6. The Information Environment .................................................................................... 13
7. The Information Domain's Role in the Decision Cycle .............................................. 14
8. Integrated Control Enablers ........................................................................................ 18
9. CCIR Process .............................................................................................................. 27
10. JIPB Process................................................................................................................ 28
11. Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method .......................................... 47
12. Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method Configured for Strategic
Level Information Requirements ................................................................................ 49
13. Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method Configured for Operational
Level Information Requirements ................................................................................ 51
14. Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method Configured for Tactical
Level Information Requirements ................................................................................ 53

viii

List of Tables
Table

Page

1. Endsley's Information Requirements Analysis Method (14:8) ................................... 25
2. Yadav's Information Requirements Analysis Method (21:17) ................................... 26
3. Offensive Counter Cyber Operations.......................................................................... 40
4. Defensive Counter Cyber Operations ......................................................................... 41
5. Cyber Warfare Support Operations ............................................................................ 43
6. Hybrid Information Requirements Analysis Method ................................................. 44
7. JIPB Process Requirements and Supporting Questions .............................................. 45

ix

IDENTIFICATION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CYBERSPACE DOMAIN

I. Introduction

Cyberspace is a dynamic environment that is becoming increasingly important to
civilizations around the world. Industries and governments are exploiting a variety of
cyberspace capabilities to gain a strategic advantage over their competition. The United
States, along with many other countries and industries have been exploiting cyberspace
capabilities without employing measures to thoroughly protect and control their cyber
interests. America’s adversaries recognize our dependence on the un-controlled
cyberspace domain and see it as a soft target for attack that could disrupt our national
center of gravity and further their agendas (9:1). The focus of this research is to identify
the information requirements that are required to enable a cyber commander to visualize
the cyber-battlespace and effectively Command and Control (C2) offensive and defensive
cyber operations.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of research efforts that are
applicable to the identification of C2 information requirements for a cyberspace
commander. The concept of cyberspace is defined first to establish the scope of the
problem area. Military C2 is introduced next to establish a general understanding of C2
theory and information requirements. The nature of the various warfighting domains is
also discussed to establish and understanding of basic domain characteristics. Finally,
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Air Force initiatives in cyberspace are overviewed to complete the framing of the
conceptual problem area. The research problem to be investigated, methodology applied,
and a preview of subsequent chapters follows the overview of research efforts.

Background
The term “cyberspace” was created by William Gibson in a 1982 science fiction
short story titled “Burning Chrome” (17:1). Gibson used the term to reference a state of
computer-simulated reality. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines cyberspace as “the
online world of computer networks and especially the internet” (19). In September 2006,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized cyberspace as a distinct warfighting domain
“characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store,
modify and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures”
(8:1). This radical expansion of the definition extends the traditional definition of
cyberspace well beyond the concept of networked computers to encompass all electronic
devices that transmit, receive, or emit electronic signals throughout the electromagnetic
spectrum (18:62).
Timely and accurate information is essential for effective C2 of every warfighting
domain. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, defines C2 as the exercise of authority
by a military commander over assigned troops to accomplish a mission (5:III-1).
Communicating critical information with assigned forces and assessing the status of the
operational environment are two key functions of C2 (5:III-1). Commanders depend on
C2 information to visualize the battlespace within a volume of time and space and
support effective decision-making (5:III-1). The information requirements depicted in
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Figure 1 typically include priority intelligence information focused on the enemy and the
operational environment and friendly forces information that details coalition force
activities and mission capabilities (5:III-11).

Figure 1. Information Requirement Categories (5:III-11)
The traditional warfighting domains of air, land, sea, and space can each be
characterized by their physical nature. Assets in the traditional domains can be visualized
and physically manipulated by the commanders to achieve the desired effects culminating
in domain superiority. Commanders in the traditional domains rely on operational
experience within their physical domain to designate the majority of their own C2
information requirements and his or her staff collects and organizes the information to
support effective decision making (5:III-11). Cyberspace has become a force enabler for
the traditional warfighting domains (9:2). The traditional domains rely on cyberspace
capabilities to attain situational awareness, tailor an appropriate course of action, and
execute that course of action to achieve desired effects throughout the battlespace (9:2).
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Figure 2 illustrates how cyber domain is used to achieve cross-domain effects (8:6).
Thus, freedom to operate in cyberspace is considered a prerequisite to effective
operations in the traditional warfighting domains because the majority of their C2
networks reside in cyberspace (9:2).

Figure 2. Cross Domain Effects (8:6)
The recognition of cyberspace as a distinct warfighting domain is the result of the
United States’ increasing dependence on cyberspace capabilities for military and civilian
purposes (8:1). In November 2006, Air Force Cyber Command was established and is
currently developing doctrine for integrating cyber effects into the Air Force’s global
strike capability and conducting offensive and defensive cyber combat operations in
support of national objectives (8:1). The virtual nature of the cyberspace along with
evolutions in information technologies has increased the volume of available information
to a point of information overload (14:1). Situational awareness in cyberspace will
therefore require finding, sorting, and integrating data into decision quality information
(14:1).
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Problem to be Investigated
The purpose of this research is to identify the information requirements that will
enable a cyberspace commander to visualize the cyber-battlespace and effectively C2
military operations throughout the cyberspace domain. The recognition of cyberspace as
a warfighting domain necessitates the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures
for C2 that are uniquely suited for military operations in cyberspace to ensure our
continued ability to operate freely in the domain. Identification of C2 information
requirements will support cyberspace commanders by providing key cyber leverage
points for inclusion in the cyber decision cycle. The C2 information requirements will
also allow cyberspace commanders to effectively employ cyber forces and capabilities to
conduct offensive, defensive, and support cyber operations. Identifying C2 information
requirements for cyberspace is a fundamental aspect of achieving cyberspace superiority
which will enable our freedom to operate in the domain while denying that same freedom
to our adversaries (8:5).
A series of investigative questions will be asked to facilitate solving this research
problem. First, what is the role of information in C2? The answer to this question will
indicate whether the basic purpose of this research is necessary or not. Second, how do
the traditional warfighting domains identify C2 information requirements? Solving this
question may identify a method for determining the C2 information requirements for
cyberspace commanders. Third, is there an existing method or, can a method be
developed for identifying information requirements for military C2 of cyberspace?
Answering this question will indicate if the identification of C2 information requirements
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for cyberspace commanders is possible and if the information requirements identification
process is reproducible.

Scope/Methodology
A content analysis will be conducted to systematically examine the study of C2,
information requirements analysis, and military doctrine to identify patterns or themes
that relate to the identification of C2 information requirements. Academic research in the
fields of situational awareness, decision support, and information requirements analysis
will be included in the body of research and evaluated based on their applicability to
military C2. Characteristics and qualities of factors contributing to the identification of
C2 information requirements will be examined and defined in concise terms to provide a
consistent conceptual framework for the remainder of the research effort. The data
resulting from this content analysis will be used to interpret the role of information in C2,
the identification of C2 information in the traditional domains and methods for
identifying C2 information requirements.

Preview
This research is organized into five chapters with the first chapter being the
introduction. Chapter II provides the literary review of pertinent background material
related to the identification of C2 information requirements. Chapter III proposes a
methodology for the identification of C2 information requirements for a cyberspace
commander. Chapter IV will determine if the C2 information requirements method
proposed in Chapter III is producible or not. Chapter V will provide a conclusion of the
research effort and offer potential areas for future study.
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II. Literature Review

Overview
This chapter provides background information that will enable the reader to
understand key research concepts related to the complexity of identifying the C2
information requirements for a cyberspace commander. The background begins with an
overview of the role of information in C2 to demonstrate how commanders depend on
information to support effective decision-making. Then, information in the traditional
warfighting domains is analyzed to highlight various natures of C2 information and
methods for determining information requirements. Air Force Cyber Command is then
discussed to frame the complex operating environment in which C2 information will be
identified and used. The final section of the chapter discusses information requirements
analysis methods that could be used to identify the C2 information requirements of
cyberspace commanders.

The Role of Information in Command and Control
Information plays a critical role in all decision making and control settings. The
military is one unique context. Drucker suggested that information that provides a
foundation for knowledge is the principal means to create wealth and power in the postcapitalist society (12:8). This idea is clearly salient to the military where timely and
accurate information is the foundation for the commander’s visualization of the
operational environment enabling them to make effective decisions (5:III-3). Figure 3
illustrates how a commander uses quality C2 information to visualize his operational
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environment (6:II-33). A force with a superior ability to gather, understand, control, and
use information has a strategic advantage on the battlefield (10:ii). Military history is full
of examples demonstrating that having the right information at the right time is often the
decisive factor of a battle (10:ii).

Figure 3. Visualization of the Operational Environment (6:II-33)

8

Information that is provided to the war fighting decision maker must be
appropriate for the level of war they are making decisions in. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint
Operations identifies three levels of war. The three levels of war are: strategic,
operational, and tactical (5:II-1). The strategic level of war represents a level in which a
nation or a group of nations determine a strategic objective they wish to achieve such as,
expel the Iraqi army from Kuwait (5:II-1). The operational level of war links the tactical
employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives such as, use fighter
aircraft to destroy Iraqi air defenses (5:II-1). The tactical level of war is focused on the
planning and execution of battles, engagement, and activities assigned to individual units
or task forces such as, destroy the anti-aircraft artillery located at Baghdad International
Airport (5:II-1). The characteristics of information required to support effective C2 are
different for each level of war.
Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations characterizes the quality of
information required to support effective decision making in Figure 4 (4:I-3). Providing
decision makers with information meeting the information quality criteria postures him to
make the best decision possible for a given situation. Information that complies with this
criterion enables the decision maker to focus on the decision at hand and not be distracted
by information items that are not directly associated with the decision that is being made
at that point in time.
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Figure 4. Information Quality Criteria (4:I-3)
The Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop was proposed by John Boyd
in the 1950s to represent the decision cycles of Air Force pilots and is still used in
military doctrine to represent the C2 decision cycle (3:1). The OODA loop presented in
Figure 1 represents the decision cycle in which decision makers observe, orient, decide,
and act (2, 3:1). Decision makers must have timely and accurate information to gain a
situational awareness (observe and orient) of the operational environment and achieve
decision superiority. Decision superiority (C2 superiority) is achieved by maintaining an
ongoing situational awareness that allows decision makers to accurately execute their
decision cycles faster than their adversary can react (10:1, 3:1).
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Figure 5. John Boyd's OODA Loop (2)
Decision makers must be able to assign meaning to information before they can
achieve a situational awareness of the domain (16:150). Failing to identify meaningful
C2 information or focusing on the wrong goal will confuse the decision maker and
corrupt the C2 process. The information must represent the battlespace in a way that
allows decision makers to understand various situations, focus on the most salient of
those situations, and make the best possible decisions (1:THB 1/26). These situations,
especially within the context of a battle are dynamic and the decision maker’s situational
awareness must change along with the situation to remain effective (15:4).
Goals provide a framework for the identification of C2 information requirements.
To be most effective, goals must be clearly stated to ensure accurate C2 information is
gathered to support goal achievement (13:14). Relating C2 information to specific goals
provides a litmus test to determine the “so what” of the information (13:14). Moreover,
decision makers typically have multiple goals that may shift in importance as time passes
(15:14). Therefore, any information used to achieve situational awareness must align
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with several goals simultaneously and be sufficiently flexible to support shifting
requirements that may arise (14:2).

Information in the Traditional Warfighting Domains
The traditional warfighting domains are functionally divided between the military
services. The Air Force has traditionally had primary responsibility for the air and space
domains. The Army has primary responsibility for the land domain and the Navy has
primary responsibility for the sea domain. The goal of the military services in each
domain is to achieve domain superiority thus ensuring friendly forces access and use of
the domain and denying the same access and use to the adversary. Information plays a
critical role in each of the traditional warfighting domains. Achieving information
superiority which is a degree of information advantage over the adversary is an integral
part of achieving superiority in the traditional war fighting domains (10:7)
Each of the traditional domains conducts offensive, defensive, and support
operations to achieve domain dominance. Military services in the traditional domains
(i.e., air, land, sea, and space) operate in well defined physical environments with proven
tactics, techniques, and procedures for achieving domain superiority. For example, an
offensive air mission against an enemy would necessitate gathering information about
possible targets, the enemy’s defense capabilities, threats to friendly forces aircraft, and
the position of friendly forces as well as civilians in relation to targets. The commander
also needs to know the availability of support crews, aircrews, aircraft, and munitions
available for the mission and their operational capabilities. This example is provided to
highlight the fact that C2 information represents the physical characteristics of the
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traditional domains. The procedures for identifying C2 information requirements in the
traditional warfighting domains must be modified to be useful for identifying C2
information requirements for cyberspace because of extensive differences between the
domains.
There are various functions conducted in the traditional domains such as counter
air, air interdiction, and close air support that are not representative of the types of
functions that will be conducted in the cyber domain. The majority of these functions are
representative to the physical nature of the domains however, a few traditional domain
operations, such as counter information operations represent a non-physical environment.
The non-physical information environment depicted in Figure 6 that is used to connect
the physical and cognitive dimensions (4:I-2). Information operations is a mission area
of counter information that is conducted within and across the traditional domains and
relates closely to the functions that will be conducted in the cyberspace domain.

Figure 6. The Information Environment (4:I-2)
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The assigned mission of Air Force Information Operations is to integrate the
employment of capabilities of influence operations, electronic warfare operations, and
network warfare operations, in concert with specified integrated control enablers, to
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making
while protecting our own (10:1). The primary goal associated with the Air Force’s
mission in information operations is to achieve information superiority. Information
superiority is a degree of dominance in the information domain which allows friendly
forces the ability to collect, control, exploit and defend information without effective
opposition (10:1). Information superiority enables decision makers across the traditional
warfighting domains to observe, orient, decide, and act faster and more effectively than
the adversary (10:1). Figure 7 illustrates the central role that the information domain and
information superiority play in a commander’s decision cycle (10:3).

Figure 7. The Information Domain's Role in the Decision Cycle (10:3)
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Information operations include influence operations, electronic warfare
operations, network warfare operations, and integrated control enablers (10:1).
Information operations are very similar to cyber warfare operations as they are conducted
to create effects across and throughout the traditional domains in all levels of conflict
(10:1). Identifying the missions, goals, and operations areas associated with information
operations will facilitate the identification of the missions, goals, operations areas, and
capabilities associated with cyber warfare.
Influence operations are conducted to affect the perceptions and behaviors of
leaders, groups, and entire populations to ultimately change the adversary’s decision
cycle (10:1). Influence operations include psychological operations, military deception,
operations security, counterintelligence operations, counterpropaganda operations, and
public affairs operations. Influence operations are conducted across the traditional
domains as well as in and through the cyber domain.
Network warfare operations are “the integrated planning, employment, and
assessment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the interconnected
analog and digital network portion of the battlespace” (10:5). These networks are an
interconnected and interrelated assortment of electronic systems which are used to store
or transmit information (10:19). Networks associated with network warfare operations
include: radio networks, satellite links, tactical digital information links, telemetry, digital
track files, telecommunications, and wireless communications networks (10:5). Network
warfare operations include offensive (network attack), defensive (network defense) and
support (network warfare support) missions (10:19).
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Network attack operations employ network capabilities to destroy, disrupt,
corrupt, deny, degrade, or usurp information that is either stored in or transmitted through
networks (10:20). Network defense operations employ network based capabilities to
defend friendly information that is either stored in or transmitted on networks from the
adversary’s attempts to destroy, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp it (10:20). Network warfare
support operations involve the collection and production of network related data that
supports effective network operations decision making (10:21). Network warfare support
enables network attack and network defense actions to find, fix, track, and assess both
adversary and friendly sources of access and vulnerability of networks (10:21). Network
warfare support personnel are responsible for producing: the network order of battle,
profiling, event analysis, open source review, and pattern analysis in support of network
warfare defense and countermeasure development, nodal and system analysis to identify
vulnerabilities in adversary networks, and full spectrum and cryptological planning and
de-conflictions (10:21).
Electronic warfare is military action involving use of the EMS or directed energy
to manipulate the EMS or attack and adversary (10:23). Electronic warfare operations
are “the integrated planning, employment, and assessment of military capabilities to
achieve desired effects across the electromagnetic domain in support of operational
objectives” (10:23). Electronic warfare operations are conducted to control and
coordinate friendly use of the EMS and attack or deny enemy use of the EMS (10:5).
Electronic warfare operations include offensive (electronic warfare attack), defensive
(electronic warfare protection), and support (electronic warfare support) missions (10:5).
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Electronic warfare attack operations utilize electromagnetic, directed energy, or
anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment (10:23). The goals
associated with electronic warfare attack are to deceive, disrupt, deny, or destroy the
adversary’s combat capabilities that utilize the EMS (10:23). Electronic warfare
protection operations are conducted to enhance the use of the EMS for friendly forces
(10:24). Electronic warfare protection is primarily a defensive function focused on
protecting personnel, facilities, and equipment from negative effects caused by either
friendly or adversary electronic warfare actions that degrade, neutralize, or destroy
friendly combat capabilities that utilize the EMS (10:24). Electronic warfare support
involves the collection of EMS data for immediate tactical applications such as, threat
avoidance, route selection, targeting or homing (10:24). The collected data supports
effective electronic warfare operations decision making (10:24). Electronic warfare
support personnel are responsible for producing: the electronic order of battle, parametric
data reflecting the electronic characteristics of electronic warfare threat systems to aid
detection and countermeasure employment (10:24).
Integrated control enablers are critical capabilities required to execute successful
operations and produce integrated effects throughout all war fighting domains (10:39).
Integrated control enabler capabilities are used to gain, exploit, and disseminate quality
information and support effective C2 (10:39). Integrated control enablers support the
commander’s ability to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess adversary and friendly
activities throughout the battlespace thus supporting effective decision making (10:39).
Integrated control enablers (see Figure 8.) include: intelligence, surveillance, and
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reconnaissance, network operations, predictive battlespace awareness, and precision
navigation and timing (10:39).

Figure 8. Integrated Control Enablers (10:40)

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities enable decision makers to
accurately conceptualize the battlespace and exploit adversary vulnerabilities (10:40).
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations include the integrated
capabilities to task, collect, process, exploit, and disseminate quality intelligence
information (10:40). Network operations are conducted to ensure all warfighting domain
operations are unimpeded by friendly or adversary network activities (10:39).
Network operations consists of organizations, procedure, and functionalities
required to plan, administer, and monitor networks in support of operations and to
respond to threats, vulnerabilities, and outages that effect operational network capabilities
(10:39).
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Predictive battlespace awareness operations provide a knowledge of the
operational environment that allows commander’s to effectively execute C2 in the
various war fighting domains (10:40). Predictive battlespace awareness provides a
methodology that enables commanders to integrate all available intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in order to maximize their ability to predict
enemy courses of action and select friendly course of action (10:40). Developing a
predictive battlespace environment requires the development and integration of:
intelligence preparation of the battlespace, target development, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance strategy and planning, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
employment, and assessment (10:40).
Precision navigation and timing are utilized to synchronize the integration of
military capabilities (10:40). The precision navigation and timing provided by spacebased assets are essential to enabling the ability to integrate and coordinate war fighting
capabilities to create effects across the various war fighting domains (10:40).

Air Force Cyber Command
The United States’ must develop the capability to protect and dominate
cyberspace because the majority of the nation’s neural networks reside in the cyber
domain (9:2). The increasing dependence on communications capabilities and
electronics used throughout the electromagnetic spectrum has led to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff’s recognition of cyberspace as a warfighting domain that is of equal importance to
national security as the traditional domains and the addition of cyberspace into the Air
Force mission statement (8:ii, 7:1). The mission of the Air Force is currently “to deliver
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sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests
- to fly and fight in air, space, and cyberspace” (8:ii). Air Force Cyber Command was
established to meet this mission requirement and develop offensive and defensive cyber
capabilities that would redefine airpower by extending the Air Force’s global vigilance,
reach, and power into cyberspace (8:ii).
The mission of the Air Force Cyber Command is to provide combat ready forces
trained and equipped to conduct offensive and defensive cyber operations in support of
national objectives (8:ii). Warfighting concepts must be developed for forces to operate
in the cyberspace domain and conduct combat operations (8:1). Capabilities in the
cyberspace domain will advance the airpower concepts of global reach and global power
into cyberspace (8:1).
As previously noted, goals play a critical role in the identification C2 information
requirements. Accordingly, the Air Force has stated explicit goals for a commander
operating in cyberspace (8:4). Specifically leaders should achieve cyberspace superiority
where superiority is defined as “the freedom to operate in the cyberspace domain while
denying that same freedom to an adversary” (8:5). Achieving superiority in cyberspace is
critical to maintaining the American military’s unique advantages in precision
engagement, situational awareness, and operational reach (8:5). The Air Force identified
the following end states for cyberspace superiority (8:4):
•
•
•
•
•
•

Deter and prevent cyberspace attacks against vital US interests (i.e., counter
cyber operations)
Rapidly respond to attacks and reconstitute networks
Integrate cyber power into the full range of global and theater effects
Defeat adversaries operating through cyberspace
Freedom of action in cyberspace for US & Allied commanders
Persistent cyberspace situational awareness
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To achieve these end states the Air Force must: develop doctrine, organize, train, and
equip cyber forces to enable successful cyber operations across the full spectrum of
conflict (8:4).
Counter cyber operations must be effectively conducted to achieve cyber
superiority (8:6). Counter cyber operations consist of offensive counter cyber and,
defensive counter cyber missions (8:6). Offensive and defensive counter cyber missions
are conducted to achieve specific military effects in the cyber domain resulting in cyber
superiority by protecting friendly cyber capabilities and destroying, degrading, or
disrupting the enemy’s cyber capability (8:6).
Offensive counter cyber operations are conducted to deny, degrade, disrupt,
destroy, or deceive the enemy’s cyber capability (8:6). Offensive counter cyber
operations can produce effects that directly impact our adversary’s ability to wage war
(8:6). Attacking and destroying an enemy’s communications network is an example of
an offensive counter cyber operation. Defensive counter cyber operations are conducted
to protect friendly forces and vital national interests from cyber attacks (8:6). Defensive
counter cyber operations preserve, protect, recover, and restore friendly cyber
capabilities before, during, and after an attack (8:6). Protecting communications
channels with intrusion detection systems is an example of defensive counter cyber
operations.
For the purpose of this research, C2 of cyberspace is considered to be in a
deployed operational environment. The Air Force operates an Air Operations Center
(AOC) to perform C2 of deployed regional operations (11:105). The AOC is “the
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operations command center for the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC)
and provides the capability to plan, task, execute, monitor, and assess the activities of
assigned or attached forces” (11:105). The AOC integrates numerous disciplines in a
cross-functional team to plan and execute a full range of joint air and space capabilities
(11:105). Each capability represented in the AOC has an individual who serves as the
principle advisor to the JFACC and the highest level of C2 for the military capability
they represent. The Director of Cyberspace Forces will serves as the senior advisor to
the JFACC within an operational war fighting environment for issues associated with the
cyberspace domain. The Director of Cyberspace Forces is the highest level of C2 for Air
Force operations in cyberspace and is responsible for tailoring cyber operations, effects,
and coalition support (8:15).
The effectiveness of the Director of Cyberspace Forces is highly dependent on
having detailed knowledge of the ever-changing cyber environment and adversary’s C2
capabilities (8:9). The Director of Cyberspace Forces must have an extensive
understanding of cyber-related constraints, capabilities, and activities to accurately target
and assess cyberspace. The Director of Cyberspace Forces must also be able to operate
throughout the cyber domain and be able to integrate cyber capabilities with traditional
domain operations to deliver global effects (8:11). The complex and rapidly evolving
operational environment of cyberspace will have a wider variety of C2 information
requirements than the traditional warfighting domains. Warfare in the cyber domain is a
new concept and there are currently no methodologies for identifying the critical
information requirements that will enable the Director of Cyberspace Forces to
effectively C2 the domain.
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Exercising C2 over the cyberspace domain is going to be a daunting task because
of the myriad of cyber data streams and information that is available. Every electronic
device throughout the electromagnetic spectrum is a potential source of C2 information.
The Director of Cyberspace Forces will need to maintain situational awareness of a
complex variety of operational elements in the cyberspace domain to effectively exercise
C2. The Director of Cyberspace Forces situational awareness requirements will need to
enable effective C2 of the following areas (8:3):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Internet protocol based terrestrial
Wireless networks
Airborne transmission systems
Space transmission networks
Non-internet protocol based networks
Data links
Telephone networks
Control systems
Electronic attack
Directed energy
Electronic protection

Information Requirements Analysis
Information requirements analysis is a process of determining the essential
elements of information that will support effective C2 decision making and not
overwhelm the decision maker (21:1). Conducting an information requirements analysis
is an essential function for each warfighting domain that enables the commander’s
visualization of the battlespace and conception of an operations strategy (5:3). The
information requirements must include information that identifies both threats and
opportunities effecting national interests (5:3). Methods for identifying information
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requirements must be tailored for each domain to provide commanders with situational
awareness of their unique warfighting domain.
Information requirements analysis methods generally fall into two categories.
The first category determines the information requirements of the organization
(warfighting domain) and the second category determines the information requirements
for an information system (21:1). Studies have shown that methods for determining the
information requirements for an information system are not suitable for determining the
information requirements of an organization. The information requirements analysis
methods for an information system do not identify decision quality information that is
required for effective decision-making. The remainder of this research effort will focus
on methodologies for determining the information requirements for C2 of a warfighting
domain.
Organizational information requirements analysis methods identify information
that is precise, purposeful, and beneficial to give the largest degree on information
awareness to decision makers (1:THB 1/27). Several methods have been outlined. First,
the Bayesian decision-making method, called “extending the discussion,” can lead to the
identification of information requirements (20:73-106). The method breaks a situation
down into sub-cases until the decision maker is able to interpret the situation and make an
informed decision (1:THB: 1/29). Extending the discussion leads to the discovery of
information requirements that are required to support decision making for each of the
sub-cases (1:THB 1/29). Second, Endsley proposed a method that employs goal-directed
task analysis to identify information requirements for organizational decision-making.
This requires identification of the major goals of an activity, along with pertinent sub
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goals needed to meet each goal. The steps of Endsley’s goal-directed task analysis
method for determining C2 information requirements are identified in Table 1 (14:8).
The desired result is to identify the information that is required to provide adequate
situational awareness to accomplish each sub goal and primary goal that was identified.
Endsley focused on goals because he believed that goals form the basis for decision
making in complex operational environments (14:8).
Table 1. Endsley's Information Requirements Analysis Method (14:8)
Goal-Directed Task Analysis
Step 1.
Identify primary missions and goals.
Step 2.
Identify sub-goals that support primary mission and goals.
Step 3.
Identify information required to achieve goals.
Finally, Yadav proposed the organizational analysis and requirements
specification method to identify organizational information requirements. Consistent
with Endsley, Yadav starts from the top with an analysis of the organization’s mission
(goals). Fundamental aspects of Yadav’s organizational analysis and requirements
specification method are detailed in Table 2 (21:17). The organizational structure is
analyzed to determine how each part of the organization contributes to mission
accomplishment (21:17). This analysis allows for the identification of functions that
must be performed in each part of the organization to accomplish the mission. The
functional requirements serve as the baseline for determining information requirements
and information characteristics of each level of the organization to support decision
making and accomplish the mission (21:17).
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Table 2. Yadav's Information Requirements Analysis
Method (21:17)
Step 1.

Step 2.

Step 3.

Step 4.

Do aggregate structural analysis
a. Describe organization missions and goals.
b. Describe operating core.
c. Describe structural configuration.
Do broad functional analysis
a. Describe major functional organizational
strategies, goals and measures of performance.
b. Describe functional structure.
c. Describe major organization systems used
for integration.
Do detailed analysis of the organizational
functions
a. Describe function goals and measures of
effectiveness for functions to be supported.
b. Describe sub-functional units and structures.
c. Describe functional systems.
Analyze managerial functions to be supported
a. Determine broad categories of managerial
activities.
b. Determine managerial roles under major
activities.
c. Identify actions to be supported under each
managerial activity.

The Department of Defense has also developed a method for identifying
information requirements in Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations. This method
depicted in Figure 9 captures information requirements in the context of the mission,
commander’s intent, and concept of operations (5:III-3, 13). It incorporates the methods
outlined by Endsley and Yadav where goals serve as the central guiding feature of all
information requirements analysis. The key elements identified during this method are
referred to as the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) (5:III-11).
The CCIRs include Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and Friendly Forces
Information (FFI) (5:III-11). PIRs drive the intelligence collection process and include
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information about the adversary and the operating environment (5:III-11). FFIs include
the operational capabilities of friendly forces (5:III-11). The CCIRs must define the
situation, identify the actors (friendly and adversary), and identify strengths, weaknesses,
and capabilities of all actors (5:II-20). The lack of tactics techniques and procedures
combined with the non-physical nature of the cyberspace domain will make the
identification of the CCIRs a difficult task for cyberspace commanders.

Figure 9. CCIR Process (5:III-3)
The Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB) process is used to
identify and collect PIRs. The questions asked during the JIPB process are also useful in
indentifying FFIRs. The JIPB process depicted in Figure 10 includes four steps that
ensure the systematic analysis of the environment and adversary (6:II-1). The JIPB
process is both continuous and cyclical to ensure CCIRs are accurate at all stages of
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executing an operational mission (6:II-1). The four steps of the JIPB process are: Step 1:
define the battlespace environment, Step 2: describe the battlespace’s effects, Step 3:
evaluate the adversary, Step 4: determine adversary course of action (6:II-1). The
elements of each step of the JIPB process are listed in Table 3 (6:II-3, II-9, II-45, II-54).

Figure 10. JIPB Process (6:II-1)
Table 3. Steps of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of
the Battlespace Process (6:II-3, II-9, II-45, II-54)
Step 1.

Define the Battlespace Environment
a. Identify the limits of the joint force's
operational area
b. Analyze the joint force's mission and joint
force commander's intent
c. Determine the significant characteristics of
the joint force's operational area
d. Establish the limits of the joint force's areas
of interest for each geographic battlespace
dimension
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Step 2.

Step 3.

Step 4.

e. Determine the full, multi-dimensional,
geographic and non-geographic spectrum of
the joint force's battlespace
f. Identify the amount of battlespace detail
required and feasible within the time
available
g. Evaluate existing data bases and identify
intelligence gaps and priorities
h. Collect the material and intelligence
required to support further JIPB Analysis.
Describe the battlespace effects
a. Analyze the battlespace environment
b. Describe the battlespace's effects on
adversary and friendly capabilities and
broad courses of action
Evaluate the adversary
a. Identify adversary centers of gravity
b. Update or create adversary models
c. Determine the current adversary situation
d. Identify adversary capabilities
Determine adversary courses of action
a. Identify the adversary's likely objectives
and desired end state
b. Identify the full set of courses of action
available to the adversary
c. Evaluate and prioritize each course of
action
d. Develop each course of action in the
amount of detail time allows
e. Identify initial collection requirements

Summary
This chapter provided background information about C2 information
requirements for the Director of Cyberspace Forces. Cyberspace was defined as a
warfighting domain that encompasses all electronic equipment operating throughout the
electromagnetic spectrum. The role of information in C2 was then discussed to
demonstrate the importance of timely and accurate information for achieving effective
C2. In addition, information in the traditional warfighting domains was analyzed to
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highlight information in physical warfighting domains as well as the information domain.
Next, Air Force Cyber Command’s mission and structure was analyzed to highlight the
unique information requirements of a complex and non-physical cyber domain. Finally,
information requirements analysis methods were analyzed to potentially determine the C2
information requirements of the Director of Cyberspace Forces. Effective C2 of
cyberspace will require development of a valid method for determining the C2
information requirements. The remainder of this research will focus on developing a
hybrid methodology for identifying the C2 information requirements of the Director of
Cyberspace Forces.

30

III. Methodology

Overview
A content analysis of C2 research, military C2 doctrine, situational awareness
research, information requirements analysis research, and Air Force cyberspace
documents was conducted to develop a method for identifying C2 information
requirements for the cyberspace domain. The method for determining the C2 information
requirements for the Director of Cyberspace Forces will be developed in three phases.
The assigned missions and goals of the cyberspace domain will be identified in phase
one. A hybrid information requirements analysis method will be constructed during
phase two. Finally, during phase three, the hybrid information requirements analysis
method will be modified to demonstrate how it can be configured to enable identification
of C2 information requirements for achieving goals at either the strategic, operational, or
tactical levels of war.

Phase One
The purpose of Phase One of this research is to identify the missions, goals, and
operations areas associated with cyberspace. Identifying the missions, goals, and
operations areas of cyberspace is the first step in identifying the information required to
achieve them. The Air Force Cyber Warfare Operational Concept will serve as the
primary source for identifying missions and goals of the cyberspace domain. Air Force
Doctrine Document 2-5 Information Operations will also used to identify potential
missions and goals of cyberspace because the types of missions and operational functions
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associated with information operations are very similar to the types of missions and
operational functions that will be conducted in cyberspace.
Phase One will be accomplished in two steps. The first step is to identify the Air
Force’s overarching missions and goals of cyberspace and information operations. This
step is required to facilitate the identification of sub-goals that are required to support
effective operations in cyberspace later on in the information requirements analysis
process. The second step is to categorize the subordinate missions, goals, and operations
areas of cyberspace and information operations into offensive, defensive, and support
categories. This step is necessary to enable decision makers to identify information
requirements in association with the category of goal they are attempting to accomplish.

Step One.
The purpose of step one is to identify the Air Force’s primary missions and goals
associated with cyberspace and information operations. The overarching mission and
supporting goals associated with cyberspace will be extracted from the Air Force Cyber
Warfare Operational Concept. The Air Force Cyber Warfare Operational Concept will
also be analyzed to identify all subordinate missions, goals, end states and operations
areas that are associated with the overarching mission and goals. The overarching
mission and supporting goals associated with information operations will be extracted
from Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5 Information Operations. Air Force Doctrine
Document 2-5 Information Operations will also be analyzed to identify all subordinate
missions, goals, end states, and operations areas associated with information operations.
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This step is critical to the identification of information that is required to support mission
and goal achievement in cyberspace and information operations.

Step Two.
The purpose of this step is to categorize the subordinate missions, goals, and
operations areas of cyberspace and information operations into offensive, defensive, and
support categories. During this step, cyber warfare operations will be incorporated along
with information operations into one comprehensive list to ensure all operations are
accounted for. The Air Force Cyber Warfare Operational Concept and Air Force
Doctrine Document 2-5 Information Operations will be analyzed to identify the types of
operations that must be conducted to accomplish the missions, goals, sub-goals, and end
states identified in step one and determine requirements for the offensive, defensive, and
support categories. Once the requirements of the categories are determined, each of the
missions, goals, sub-goals, and end states identified in step one will be assigned to the
appropriate offensive, defensive, or support category.

Phase Two
The purpose of Phase 2 is to develop a hybrid information requirements analysis
method that utilizes aspects of methods developed by Endsley and the Department of
Defense. The steps taken to create the hybrid information requirements analysis method
will be accomplished to build validity into the cyberspace C2 information requirements
analysis process. Endsley’s three-step goal-directed information requirements analysis
method will serve as the baseline for the hybrid method. The primary missions and goals
will be identified in Step 1. Sub-goals that support higher-level goals will identified in
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step two. The Department of Defense’s CCIR process will be accomplished in Step 3 of
the hybrid information requirements analysis method. The hybrid information
requirements analysis method developed in this research will be in the form of a
template.
During Step 1, the primary goals associated with operations in cyberspace will be
identified. Step 1 of the hybrid information requirements analysis method template will
require users to insert a goal in the corresponding Step 1 goal section.
Step 2 of the hybrid information requirements analysis method will require the
identification of an appropriate sub-goal with higher-level goal identified in Step 1. For
example: Deterring cyberspace attacks against vital US interests is a sub-goal of the
primary goal of achieving cyber superiority. Step 2 of the hybrid information
requirements analysis method template will require users to insert an appropriate subgoal in the corresponding Step 2 sub-goal section.
Step 3 of the hybrid information requirements analysis method will incorporate
the Department of Defense’s CCIR process. Principles of JIPB will be utilized to add
validity to the CCIR process and ensure the information gathered is adequate for
achieving military objectives. The JIPB process will be employed to solicit quality C2
information that will enable the Director of Cyberspace Forces to make effective
decisions. A list of questions that correspond with JIPB process requirements will be
developed to solicit both PIRs and FFIs. The four steps of the JIPB will be combined
into one group of questions that corresponds with JIPB process requirements. The JIPB
and corresponding questions will be divided on the template into PIRs and FIRs. Step 3
of the hybrid information requirements analysis method template will list PIRs and FIRs
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and associated JIPB process questions. Users will be required to answer the questions
associated with the PIRs and FFIs to collect the required C2 information.

Phase Three
The purpose of Phase Three will be to demonstrate how the hybrid information
requirements analysis method template can be modified to identify C2 information
required to achieve goals at either the strategic, operational, or tactical level of war.
There are no modifications required for Steps 1 and 2. The JIPB’s supporting questions
in Step 3 of the hybrid information requirements analysis method will be modified to
solicit increasingly more detailed information to support achieving more detailed goals.
The hybrid information requirements analysis template will be modified three
times. The first time, the template will be modified to solicit information requirements
necessary to achieve strategic level of war goals. A strategic level of war goal will be
input in step one of the method. A corresponding sub-goal will be input in step two of
the method. The CCIR questions that correspond with the JIPB process requirements
will be modified to support achievement of a strategic level of war goal in step three of
the method.
The second time, the template will be modified to solicit information
requirements necessary to achieve operational level of war goals. An operational level of
war goal will be input in step one of the method. A corresponding sub-goal will be input
in step two of the method. The CCIR questions that correspond with the JIPB process
requirements will be modified to support achievement of an operational level of war goal
in step three of the method.
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The final time, the template will be modified to solicit information requirements
necessary to achieve tactical level of war goals. A tactical level of war goal will be input
in step one of the method. A corresponding sub-goal will be input in step two of the
method. The CCIR questions that correspond with the JIPB process requirements will be
modified to support achievement of a tactical level of war goal in step three of the
method.
The information requirements analysis method developed in this chapter will
provides a template for meeting the C2 information needs of the Director of Cyberspace
Forces. The level of detail required to achieve specific goals will change as the goals do.
The hybrid information requirements analysis template will serve as a starting point for
determining the information requirements of the Director of Cyberspace Forces to
facilitate effective C2 of cyberspace.
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IV. Analysis and Results

The purpose of this chapter is to develop an information requirements analysis
method that will meet the C2 information needs of the Director of Cyberspace Forces.
The literature review and content analysis of C2 research, military C2 doctrine,
situational awareness research, information requirements analysis research, and Air Force
cyberspace doctrine provides a framework for identifying the C2 information
requirements of the Director of Cyberspace Forces. The information requirement
analysis method is developed in three phases. Cyberspace missions and goals are
identified in phase one. A hybrid information requirements analysis method is developed
in phase two. In phase three, the hybrid information requirements analysis method is
modified to demonstrate how it can be used to identify C2 information requirements for
achieving goals at either the strategic, operational, or tactical level of war.

Phase One
The purpose of Phase One of this research is to identify the missions, goals, and
operations areas associated with cyberspace. Identifying the missions, goals, and
operations areas of cyberspace is the first step in identifying the information required to
achieve them. The Air Force Cyber Warfare Operational Concept serves as the primary
source used to identify the missions, goals, and requirements for cyberspace. Air Force
Doctrine Document 2-5 Information Operations was also used to identify potential
missions and goals of cyberspace because information operations already has well
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developed operational doctrine and both information operations and cyber operations are
executed across and throughout the traditional domains to achieve desired effects (10:1).
Phase One is accomplished in two steps. The first step is to identify the Air
Force’s overarching missions and goals for cyberspace and information operations. The
second step is to categorize the subordinate missions, goals, and operations areas of
cyberspace and information operations into offensive, defensive, and support categories.

Step One.
The purpose of Step One is to identify the Air Forces’ overarching missions and
goals of cyberspace and information operations. The Air Force mission in cyberspace is
to redefine airpower by extending the Air Force’s global vigilance, reach, and power into
the cyberspace domain (8:ii). This mission statement serves as the starting point for
determining subordinate missions, goals, and operations areas that are required to support
accomplishment of the Air Force’s mission in cyberspace.
The primary goal associated with the Air Force’s mission in cyberspace is to
achieve cyber superiority. Achieving cyber superiority requires ensuring our ability to
operate freely in cyberspace while denying the ability to operate freely in cyberspace to
our adversary (8:5). The end state goals of cyber superiority are (8:4).
•
•
•
•
•
•

Deter and prevent cyberspace attacks against vital US interests
Rapidly respond to attacks and reconstitute networks
Integrate cyber power into the full range of global and theater effects
Defeat adversaries operating through cyberspace
Freedom of action in cyberspace for US & Allied commanders
Persistent cyberspace situational awareness
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The Air Force Information Operations Mission is to integrate the employment of
capabilities of influence operations, electronic warfare operations, and network warfare
operations, in concert with specified integrated control enablers, to influence, disrupt,
corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our
own. The primary goal associated with the Air Force’s mission in information operations
is to achieve information superiority. Information superiority is a degree of dominance in
the information domain, which allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control,
exploit and defend information without effective opposition.

Step Two.
The purpose of Step Two is to categorize the missions, goals, and operations areas
of cyberspace and information operations into offensive, defensive, and support
categories. Cyber warfare operations are incorporated with information operations to
ensure a robust spectrum of operations is accounted for. The incorporated operations are
then assigned to an offensive, defensive, or support category. The Air Force Cyber
Warfare Operational Concept states that cyber superiority is achieved through the
successful execution of counter cyber operations (8:8). Counter cyber operations consist
of offensive and defensive counter cyber operations (8:8). Cyber warfare support is
conducted to ensure the survivability and sustainability of the cyber infrastructure,
oversee cyber weapons system development, and cyber force development.
Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5 Information Operations divides both electronic
and network warfare into offensive, defensive, and support operations. The support
category of information operations is defined more clearly than cyber warfare support
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and is used in this analysis to provide more structure to the cyber warfare support
operations. The integrated control enabler component of information operations is also
incorporated into the cyber warfare support function because it encompasses the types of
support requirements that facilitate extending cyber capabilities across the traditional war
fighting domains.

Offensive Counter Cyber Operations.
Offensive counter cyber operations includes electronic attack and network attack
and are conducted against personnel, facilities, equipment, radio networks, satellite
networks, radar networks, data links, telemetry, digital track files, telecommunications
networks, and wireless communications networks. The goal of offensive counter cyber
operations is to deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, deceive, corrupt, or usurp the adversary’s
cyber capabilities. Table 4 represents a comprehensive list of missions and goals of
offensive counter cyber operations.
Table 3. Offensive Counter Cyber Operations
Offensive Counter Cyber Operations
Mission
• Attack the adversary’s
• Personnel
• Facilities
• Equipment
• Data Networks
• Radio Networks
• Satellite Networks
• Radar Networks
• Data Links
• Telemetry
• Digital Track Files
• Telecommunications Networks
• Wireless Communications Networks
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Goals
• Deny
• Degrade
• Disrupt
• Destroy
• Deceive
• Corrupt
• Usurp
The adversary’s cyber capabilities
Defensive Counter Cyber Operations.
Defensive counter cyber operations include electronic protection and network
defense and are conducted to protect friendly forces, facilities, equipment, and vital
interests from an adversary’s cyber attack. The goals associated with of defensive
counter cyber operations are to preserve, protect, detect, react to internal and external
attacks, determine the nature of cyber threats, recover, reconstitute friendly cyber
capabilities before, during, and after an adversary attack, and develop defensive courses
of actions. Table 5 represents a comprehensive list of missions and goals of defensive
counter cyber operations.
Table 4. Defensive Counter Cyber Operations
Defensive Counter Cyber Operations
Mission
• Protect friendly:
o Personnel
o Facilities
o Equipment
o Data Networks
o Radio Networks
o Satellite Networks
o Radar Networks
o Data Links
o Telemetry
o Digital Track Files
o Telecommunications Networks
o Wireless Communications Networks
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From an adversary’s cyber attack
Goals
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Preserve
Protect
Detect
React to internal and external attacks
Determine the nature of cyber threats
Recover
Reconstitute friendly cyber capabilities before, during, and
after an adversary attack
Against the adversary’s cyber warfare attack capabilities
Output
• Defensive courses of action
To respond to potential a potential cyber attack
Cyber Warfare Support Operations.
Cyber warfare support operations include electronic warfare support, network
warfare support, and integrated control enablers. Cyber warfare support operations cover
a broad range of activities including: collection of electromagnetic data for immediate
tactical applications, collection and production of network related data, electromagnetic
spectrum de-confliction, vulnerability assessment, crypto logical planning and deconfliction, intelligence collection, processing, exploitation and dissemination, network
operations, parametric data reflecting electronic characteristics of various electronic
warfare threat systems, characteristics of threat and target systems, network profiling,
event analysis, open source review, and the identification of potential vulnerabilities in
the adversaries cyber systems predictive battlespace awareness and precision navigation
and timing. The goals associated with cyber warfare support operations are to find, fix,
track, target, engage, assess the adversary’s cyber capabilities and assess vulnerabilities
in friendly cyber capabilities. Products produced within cyber warfare support operations
include: cyber order of battle, electronic order of battle, and network order of battle.
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Table 6 represents a comprehensive list of missions and goals of cyber warfare support
operations.
Table 5. Cyber Warfare Support Operations
Cyber Warfare Support Operations
Missions
• Collect electromagnetic data for immediate tactical
applications
• Collect and produce network related data
• Network profiling
• Event analysis
• Network operations
• Electromagnetic spectrum de-confliction
• Vulnerability assessment of friendly and adversary cyber
systems
• Crypto logical planning and de-confliction
• Intelligence collection, processing, exploitation, and
dissemination
• Characteristics of threat and target systems
• Determine electronic characteristics of various electronic
warfare threat systems
• Develop predictive battlespace awareness
• Precision navigation and timing
Goals
• Find
• Fix
• Track
• Target
• Engage
• Assess
The adversary’s cyber warfare capabilities
• Assess
• Maintain
Friendly cyber capabilities
Output
• Cyber order of battle
o Electronic order of battle
o Network order of battle
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Phase Two
The purpose of Phase 2 is to develop a hybrid information requirements analysis
method that utilizes aspects of methods developed by Endsley and the Department of
Defense. Endsley’s three-step goal-directed information requirements analysis method
serves as the baseline for the hybrid method. Primary missions and goals are identified in
Step 1. Sub-goals that support higher-level goals are identified in Step 2. The
Department of Defense’s CCIR process replaces Step 3 of Endsley’s method (see Table
7).
Table 6. Hybrid Information Requirements Analysis Method
Step 1.
Step 2.
Step 3.

Hybrid Information Requirements Analysis Method
Identify primary missions and goals.
Identify sub-goals that support primary missions and goals.
Identify the Commander Critical Information Requirements.

Actions required in Step 1 of the hybrid information requirements analysis
method were accomplished in Phase One of this chapter. Step 2 of the hybrid
information requirements analysis method requires information gatherers to associate an
appropriate sub-goal with the primary and goal that was identified in Step 1. For
example: Deterring cyberspace attacks against vital US interests is an appropriate subgoal of the primary goal of achieving cyber superiority. Determining the sub-goals will
be a recurring process until the correct level of granularity is achieved to identify
information requirements that support the various levels of C2 decision that must be
made.
Step 3 of the hybrid information requirements analysis method employs the
Department of Defense’s CCIR process. Principles of the JIPB process are utilized to
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add rigor to the CCIR process and ensure the information gathered is adequate for
achieving military objectives. The JIPB process requirements and corresponding
questions listed in Table 8 represent the level of detail required to provide the Director of
Cyberspace Forces with C2 information and support effective decision-making.
Table 7. JIPB Process Requirements and Supporting Questions
JIPB Process Requirements
1. Define the battlespace environment
• Identify the limits of the joint force's
operational area
• Analyze the joint force's mission and
joint force commander's intent
• Determine the significant
characteristics of the joint force's
operational area

Supporting Questions
PIRs
• Who is the adversary?
• What are the adversary’s strategic and
operational objectives?

2. Describe the battlespace’s effects.
• Describe the battlespace's effects on
adversary and friendly capabilities and
broad courses of action

PIRs
• How does the adversary operate in
cyberspace?
• How does the adversary utilize cyber
assets to achieve effects throughout
other warfighting domains?
• What elements of the physical
environment limit cyberspace
capabilities?
• How does the adversary defend its cyber
capabilities?

FFIs
• What are the limits of the joint force’s
operational area?
• What is the joint forces’ mission?
• What is the joint forces commander’s
intent?
• What are our strategic and operational
objectives?

FFIs
• What are our limitations to cyberspace
operations in this physical environment?
• What cyber effects are available to
attack the adversary’s cyber defenses?
3. Evaluate the adversary.

PIRs
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• Identify adversary centers of gravity
• Identify adversary capabilities

4. Determine adversary COAs.
• Identify the adversary's likely
objectives and desired end state
• Identify the full set of courses of action
available to the adversary
• Identify the adversary’s objectives
• Identify the COAs available to the
Adversary
• Identify the adversary’s capabilities
• Identify the adversary’s vulnerabilities

• What are the adversary’s strategic and
operational cyber centers of gravity?
• What are the adversary’s offensive cyber
capabilities?
• What are the adversary’s defensive
cyber capabilities?
FFIs
• What are our strategic and operational
cyber centers of gravity?
• What are our offensive cyber
capabilities?
• What are our defensive cyber
capabilities?
PIRs
• What is the adversary’s desired end
state?
• What COAs are available to the
adversary?
• What are the adversary’s cyber
capabilities?
• What are the adversary’s cyber
vulnerabilities?
FFIs
• What is our desired end state?
• What COAs are available to us?
• What are our cyber capabilities?
• What are our cyber vulnerabilities?

A template for determining the C2 information requirements of the Director of
Cyberspace Forces was developed to ensure the information gathered supports achieving
the identified sub-goal and that the sub-goal is associated with the appropriate
overarching goal (see Figure 11).
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Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method
Step 1. Goal Identification
Goal?
Goal:
Step 2. Sub-Goal Identification
Sub-Goal?
Sub-Goal:
Step 3. Determine CCIRs
a. Who is the adversary?
PIRs
b. What are the adversary’s strategic and operational objectives?
c. How does the adversary operate in cyberspace?
d. How does the adversary utilize cyber assets to achieve effects
throughout other warfighting domains?
e. What elements of the physical environment limit cyberspace
capabilities?
f. How does the adversary defend its cyber capabilities?
g. What are the adversary’s strategic and operational cyber centers of
gravity?
h. What are the adversary’s offensive cyber capabilities?
i. What are the adversary’s defensive cyber capabilities?
j. What is the adversary’s desired end state?
k. What COAs are available to the adversary?
l. What are the adversary’s cyber vulnerabilities?
FFIs

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.

What are the limits of the joint force’s operational area?
What is the joint forces’ mission?
What is the joint forces commander’s intent?
What are our strategic and operational objectives?
What are our limitations to cyberspace operations in this physical
environment?
What cyber effects are available to attack the adversary’s cyber
defenses?
What are our strategic and operational cyber centers of gravity?
What are our offensive cyber capabilities?
What are our defensive cyber capabilities?
What is our desired end state?
What COAs are available to us?
What are our cyber vulnerabilities?

Figure 11. Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method
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Phase Three
The purpose of Phase Three is to demonstrate how the hybrid information
requirements analysis method can be modified to identify C2 information required to
achieve goals at either the strategic, operational, or tactical level of war. There are no
modifications required for Steps 1 and 2. Step 3 of the hybrid information requirements
analysis method must be modified to require increasingly more detailed information to
support achieving goals that are more detailed.
Figure 12 represents the hybrid information requirements analysis method that is
configured to support C2 information requirements at the strategic level of war. The
information requirements analysis method template developed in phase two represents
information requirements for the strategic level of war. As such, no modifications are
made to Step 3 of the method.

Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method
Step 1. Goal Identification
Achieve Cyber Superiority
Goal:
Step 2. Sub-Goal Identification
Defeat adversaries operating through cyberspace
Sub-Goal:
Step 3. Determine CCIRs
a. Who is the adversary?
PIRs
b. What are the adversary’s strategic and operational objectives?
c. How does the adversary operate in cyberspace?
d. How does the adversary utilize cyber assets to achieve effects
throughout other warfighting domains?
e. What elements of the physical environment limit cyberspace
capabilities?
f. How does the adversary defend its cyber capabilities?
g. What are the adversary’s strategic and operational cyber centers of
gravity?
h. What are the adversary’s offensive cyber capabilities?
i. What are the adversary’s defensive cyber capabilities?
j. What is the adversary’s desired end state?
k. What COAs are available to the adversary?
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l. What are the adversary’s cyber vulnerabilities?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

FFIs

f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.

What are the limits of the joint force’s operational area?
What is the joint forces’ mission?
What is the joint forces commander’s intent?
What are our strategic and operational objectives?
What are our limitations to cyberspace operations in this physical
environment?
What cyber effects are available to attack the adversary’s cyber
defenses?
What are our strategic and operational cyber centers of gravity?
What are our offensive cyber capabilities?
What are our defensive cyber capabilities?
What is our desired end state?
What COAs are available to us?
What are our cyber vulnerabilities?

Figure 12. Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method Configured for
Strategic Level Information Requirements
Figure 13 represents the hybrid information requirements analysis method that is
configured to support C2 information requirements at the operational level of war. The
primary goal (Step 1) in this example is eliminate surveillance radar capability in Country
X. The sub-goal (Step 2) in this example is to destroy the communications connectivity
between the four surveillance radar sites in Country X. The PIRs and FFIs in Step 3 are
more detailed to support achieving these goals. The modifications are printed in bold
italic (bold italic) to highlight modifications. This operational level of warfare
information requirements analysis method can be compared to Figure 11 to see
modifications.
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Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method
Step 1. Goal Identification
Eliminate surveillance radar capability in Country X
Goal:
Step 2. Sub-Goal Identification
Destroy the communications connectivity between the four
Sub-Goal:
surveillance radar sites in Country X
Step 3. Determine CCIRs
a. Who is the adversary?
PIRs
b. What are the adversary’s strategic and operational objectives in
reference to their surveillance radar?
c. How does the adversary operate their surveillance radar?
d. How is communications connectivity provided between the
adversary’s four surveillance radar sites?
e. How does the adversary utilize surveillance radar assets to
achieve effects throughout other warfighting domains?
f. What elements of the physical environment limit surveillance
radar capabilities?
g. How does the adversary defend the communications connectivity
between their four surveillance radar sites?
h. What are the adversary’s communications connectivity centers of
gravity between their four surveillance radar sites?
i. What are the adversary’s offensive capabilities related to
communications connectivity between their four surveillance
radar sites?
j. What are the adversary’s capabilities to defend communications
connectivity between their four surveillance radar sites?
k. What is the adversary’s desired end state of having
communications connectivity between their four surveillance
radar sites?
l. What COAs are available to the adversary if communications
connectivity between their four surveillance radar sites is lost?
m. What are the adversary’s communications connectivity
vulnerabilities between their four surveillance radar sites?
FFIs

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

What are the limits of the joint force’s operational area?
What is the joint forces’ mission?
What is the joint forces commander’s intent?
What are our strategic and operational objectives?
What are our limitations to cyberspace operations in this physical
environment that will impact our ability to destroy the
communications connectivity between the four surveillance
radar sites in Country X?
f. What cyber effects are available to attack the adversary’s
communications connectivity between the four surveillance
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g.

h.

i.

j.
k.

l.

radar sites in Country X?
What are our strategic and operational cyber centers of gravity
relative to destroying the adversary’s communications
connectivity between their four surveillance radar sites?
What are our offensive cyber capabilities to destroy the
communications connectivity between the four surveillance
radar sites in Country X ?
What are our defensive cyber capabilities to defend our cyber
assets that are utilized to destroy communications connectivity
between the four surveillance radar sites in Country X?
What is our desired end state?
What COAs are available to us to destroy communications
connectivity between the four surveillance radar sites in Country
X?
What are our cyber vulnerabilities associated with destroying
communications connectivity between the four surveillance
radar sites in Country X?

Figure 13. Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method Configured for
Operational Level Information Requirements
Figure 14 represents the hybrid information requirements analysis method that is
configured to support C2 information requirements at the tactical level of war. The
primary goal (Step 1) in this example is to eliminate off site communications capabilities
at Base A in Country X. The sub-goal (Step 2) in this example is to destroy the
adversary’s telephone connectivity between Base A and the rest of Country X. The PIRs
and FFIs in Step 3 are more detailed to support achieving these goals. The modifications
are printed in bold italic (bold italic) to highlight modifications. This tactical level of
warfare information requirements analysis method can be compared to Figure 11 to see
modifications.
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Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method
Step 1. Goal Identification
Eliminate off site communications capabilities at Base A in Country X
Goal:
Step 2. Sub-Goal Identification
Destroy the adversary’s telephone connectivity between Base A and
Sub-Goal:
the rest of Country X
Step 3. Determine CCIRs
a. Who is the adversary?
PIRs
b. What are the adversary’s strategic and operational objectives?
c. How does the adversary provide telephone connectivity between
Base A and the rest of Country X?
d. How does the adversary utilize telephone connectivity between
Base A and the rest of Country X to achieve effects throughout
other warfighting domains?
e. What elements of the physical environment limit telephone
connectivity between Base A and the rest of Country X?
f. How does the adversary defend its telephone connectivity
between Base A and the rest of Country X?
g. What are the adversary’s strategic and operational cyber centers of
gravity related to telephone connectivity between Base A and the
rest of Country X?
h. What are the adversary’s offensive cyber capabilities related to
telephone connectivity between Base A and the rest of Country
X?
i. What are the adversary’s defensive cyber capabilities to defend
telephone connectivity between Base A and the rest of Country
X?
j. What is the adversary’s desired end state?
k. What COAs are available to the adversary if telephone
connectivity between Base A and the rest of Country X is
attacked?
l. What are the adversary’s cyber vulnerabilities related to telephone
connectivity between Base A and the rest of Country X?
FFIs

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

What are the limits of the joint force’s operational area?
What is the joint forces’ mission?
What is the joint forces commander’s intent?
What are our strategic and operational objectives?
What are our limitations to cyberspace operations in this physical
environment related to destroying telephone connectivity between
Base A and the rest of Country X?
f. What cyber effects are available to attack the adversary’s cyber
defenses related to destroying telephone connectivity between
Base A and the rest of Country X?
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g. What are our strategic and operational cyber centers of gravity
related to destroying telephone connectivity between Base A and
the rest of Country X?
h. What are our offensive cyber capabilities related to destroying
telephone connectivity between Base A and the rest of Country
X?
i. What are our defensive cyber capabilities?
j. What is our desired end state?
k. What COAs are available to us related to destroying telephone
connectivity between Base A and the rest of Country X?
l. What are our cyber vulnerabilities related to attacking telephone
connectivity between Base A and the rest of Country X?
Figure 14. Cyberspace Information Requirements Analysis Method Configured for
Tactical Level Information Requirements
The information requirements analysis method developed in this chapter provides
a template for meeting the C2 information needs of the Director of Cyberspace Forces.
The level of detail required to achieve specific goals will change as the goals do. The
hybrid information requirements analysis template is intended to serve as a starting point
for determining the information requirements of the Director of Cyberspace Forces to
facilitate effective C2 of cyberspace.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Conclusions
The goals of this research effort were to demonstrate the need to identify C2
information requirements and develop a method of identifying C2 information
requirements that would enable the Director of Cyberspace Forces to execute effective
C2 of cyberspace. Emphasizing the role of information in C2 and highlighting the
complex nature of cyberspace demonstrated the need to identify C2 information
requirements in an effort to facilitate effective decision-making. A hybrid information
requirements analysis method was developed to support the identification of C2
information for cyberspace. The hybrid information requirements analysis template was
designed to enable modifications that enable the collection of C2 information for the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
The hybrid information requirements analysis method successfully incorporates
Endsley’s goal directed task analysis method with the Department of Defense’s CCIR
process. Principles of the JIPB process successfully added rigor to the CCIR process and
provide a valid framework for determining cyber information requirements that are
required for effective C2 of a war fighting environment. The hybrid information
requirements analysis method developed in this research successfully identifies C2
information requirements for the Director of Cyberspace Forces to enable effective C2 of
cyberspace.
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Recommendations for Future Research
The following paragraphs provide some topic areas for future research in areas
related to the identification of C2 information requirements for the Director of
Cyberspace Forces.
Intelligence Preparation of the Cyber Battlespace. The information requirements
analysis method developed in this research could be used to construct intelligence
preparation of the cyber battlespace theories. The missions and goals identified in this
research are very likely to be similar to an adversary’s missions and goals in cyberspace.
The information requirements scheme from the hybrid information requirements analysis
method could be combined with missions and goals of cyberspace and produce method
for identifying and selecting cyber targets to achieve operational and/or strategic cyber
objectives.
Develop Cyber Order of Battle. Due to the relative newness of recognizing
cyberspace as a war fighting domain, there are no cyber order of battle theories that
encompass cyber operations conducted throughout and across the entire electromagnetic
spectrum. The C2 information requirements analysis method developed in this research
could serve as a foundation for developing cyber order of battle theory. The missions,
goals, and C2 information requirements provided in this research could provide a basis
for developing cyber order of battle theory.
Develop Cyber Common Operating Picture (COP). A COP is a useful tool
providing both operators and commanders with the ability to visualize the battlespace.
The missions, goals, and C2 information requirements identified in this research could
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serve as a baseline for providing a cyber COP for the strategic, operational, and tactical
view of the battlespace.
Assign Value Attribute to Cyber C2 Information. It is important to be able to
assign a value to attribute to information to indicate the significance of the information to
the war fighter. The value attribute assigned to C2 information would indicate which
cyber assets are most critical for successful operations in cyberspace. The value
attributes could be used to develop defense strategies, circuit activation, and restoral
priorities. The missions, goals, and C2 information requirements could be utilized to
assign value attributes to cyber C2 information.
Summary
This research presents a method for identifying the C2 information requirements
of the Director of Cyberspace Forces. Cyberspace is currently an extremely dynamic
environment in terms of development of doctrine, policy, and the way ahead for cyber
operations. Much of this research effort is based on the Air Force Cyber Warfare
Operational Concept, which is an evolving document that has experienced major
direction shifts during the past two years. It is quite possible that the document could
undergo another radical revision, which would require revisions to the missions, goals,
and operations areas used in the hybrid cyberspace information requirements analysis
method developed in this research.
Chapter I presents pertinent background information related to C2 and
cyberspace. Chapter I also includes scope of the research along with the research
methodology. Chapter II provides background information that enables the reader to
understand key research concepts related to the complexity of identifying C2 information
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requirements for the Director of Cyberspace Forces. The background details the
categorization of cyberspace as a military warfighting domain and the role of information
in C2. In addition, information in the traditional warfighting domains is discussed along
with methods for determining information requirements. Air Force Cyber Command is
also discussed to frame the complex operating environment in which C2 information
must be identified and used. The final section of the chapter focused on various
information requirements analysis methods that are useful for identifying the C2
information requirements.
Chapter III presents the methodology used in this research. A content analysis of
C2 research, military C2 doctrine, situational awareness research, information
requirements analysis research, and Air Force cyberspace documents was performed to
develop a method for identifying C2 information requirements for the cyberspace
domain. The method for determining the C2 information requirements is executed in
three phases. The assigned missions and goals of the cyberspace domain were identified
in phase one. A hybrid information requirements analysis method was constructed
during phase two. The hybrid information requirements analysis method was modified in
phase three to identify C2 information required to achieve goals at either the strategic,
operational, or tactical level of war.
Chapter IV applies the methodology from Chapter III to develop a hybrid
information requirements analysis method to meet the C2 information requirements of
the Director of Cyberspace Forces. Cyberspace missions, goals, and operations areas
were identified in Phase One. A hybrid information requirements analysis method was
developed in phase two. In phase three, the hybrid information requirements analysis
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method was modified to demonstrate how it could be used to identify C2 information
requirements for the strategic, operational, and tactical level of war.
Chapter V provides conclusions from this research and suggests potential areas
for future research related to the identification of C2 information requirements for the
Directed of Cyberspace Forces.
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